CURRENT RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Publication Date: November 16, 1995
First Submitted: October 30, 1995
Resubmitted: November 9, 1995
Accepted: November 10, 1995
THE COALITION STRUCTURE OF THE FOUR-PERSON FAMILY*
Oscar Grusky
Phillip Bonacich
Cynthia Webster
University of California, Los Angeles
ABSTRACT
Caplow's model of coalitions and power relations in triads is here
extended to tetrads. Forty-eight four-person families were studied
with equal numbers of each of the four sibling gender and birth
position constellations: older boy-younger girl; older girl-younger
boy; two boys; and two girls. A total of 673 coalitions were
identified. It was found that arguments led to coalitions about 30%
of the time, with spousal coalitions found to be the dominant type.
Support was thus found for Caplow's model, maintaining that power
counts in family decision-making. Family composition was shown to be
related to the formation of conservative, revolutionary, and improper
coalitions.
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INTRODUCTION
"Family life is fraught with the tension of conflicting emotions
precisely because it is based on coalitions.... A family is sustained
by the interlocking forces of love and hate in somewhat the same way
that buildings are held up by the opposing forces of tension and
compression" (Caplow, 1968).
Although Caplow may exaggerate the significance of coalitions for
families, his perspective encourages deeper examination of family
coalition phenomena. Caplow's (1968) study of coalitions in triads
with special emphasis on family organization remains one of the most
sophisticated theoretical treatments to date. The present study
examines four-person rather than three-person families, and in
contrast to Caplow's work, is considerably more empirical. The first
goal of this paper, then, is to describe the coalition structure of
the four-person family. We describe in detail the methods used to
measure coalitions in the family with particular focus on
conservative coalitions and revolutionary coalitions as described by
Gamson (1961a; 1961b) and Caplow (1968). Then we apply these
definitions to four-person families to demonstrate that Caplow's
triadic theory of coalitions can be usefully applied to four-person
families and possibly to other tetrads.
Utility theory underlies Caplow's model in that it is assumed that
family conflict is governed by the rational assessment of benefits
and costs, thus implying that family members initiate conflicts
because the perceived benefits of conflict outweigh the perceived
costs. The benefits of conflict may include higher self-esteem or
less esoteric rewards, such as additional resources. The costs may
also be the loss of valued resources and/or psychological losses. The
application of utility theory to conflict has a long history
(Rapoport, 1957; Schelling, 1960; McGinnis, 1991; Coleman, 1991.)
Cook and Gillmore (1984) have pointed out that coalition theories
have largely ignored the analysis of power struggles among actors;
therefore, not much is known about coalition formation in situations
(such as in the family) where power differences may have long-term
consequences. By moving out of the laboratory and exploring family
dynamics, a number of difficult but significant questions regarding
power relations may be explored that can add to our knowledge of
coalition dynamics.
One question, for instance, concerns the frequency of coalitions
in four person families. Families with two parents and two children,
unlike those with three members, have an opportunity to form counter-
coalitions (such as parents versus children). So, in addition to the
question of how often coalitions form, there is raised the further
question: what types of coalitions predominate in four-person
families?
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As indicated, power is the central concept in Caplow's theory of
coalitions in the family triad. Caplow asserts that coalitions form
because the parties seek power in order to obtain desired resources.
This raises the question with regard to four-person families: how
important is power in determining who wins or loses? Finally, one
important aspect of family power structures is family composition or
gender distribution. Hence, the fourth question examined concerns the
relationship between the coalition structure and family gender
composition in four person families.
METHODS
Sample
Questionnaires were distributed to approximately 1500 children at
a junior high school in a suburban Los Angeles community. From these
questionnaires families were selected that satisfied these criteria:
two children living with both their natural parents, the younger
child between the ages of eight and twelve, the older between twelve
and sixteen. The minimum age was set by the younger child's ability
to be an effective interviewee when asked questions about family
dynamics. The older child had to be sufficiently older so that there
could be a significant power difference between the children, but not
so old that he or she was about to leave the family. Sex was
balanced, with half of the younger children and half of the older
children being male. We contacted 78 families to get the 48 families
in the study. Family members were interviewed together and separately
for three to four hours using a variety of instruments designed to
measure different aspects of family decision-making and attitudes of
family members toward each other.
The parents were married an average of 16 years. Only two
parents, both males, had been married before. Neither had children
by their previous marriages. Fathers' occupations were mainly
business-related or professional. There were eleven attorneys, five
professors or deans, and four engineers. The rest were businessmen.
Seventeen wives reported full-time employment, and fourteen reported
part-time employment outside the home.
Because of the area in which the school was located, median income
was high, $64,000. Fathers and mothers averaged 42 and 39 years of
age, respectively. The median income of husbands fell into the $40-
80,000 range, while the median income of the wives was $10-12,000.
In 86% of the 44 families in which both spouses answered our income
question, the husband's income was higher than the wife's. Eighteen
of the 48 husbands reported incomes of $75,000 or more, while no wife
did. The picture was similar with respect to years of education. In
28 of the families, the husband had more years of education than the
wife; in thirteen families, they were equal; and in seven families,
the wife had more years of education than the husband.
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Coalition Measures
Coalitions exist when family members jointly use their power to
control a decision. Coalitions are not the same as affective cliques
of mutual attraction. Coalitions are not indicated by the absence of
disputes among family members. Family members who do not argue are
not in a coalition unless they support one another in disputes with
other family members. Thus, for our purposes, coalitions are
measured by the frequency with which family members support one
another in arguments. This definition meets the strict criterion
stated by Gamson (1961b:84) that "participation on the same side of
an argument is sufficient justification for asserting that a
coalition has been formed."
Each family member was asked a set of questions about each of the
six possible dyadic arguments in the family: father versus mother;
father versus older child; father versus younger child; mother versus
older child; mother versus younger child; and older child versus
younger child. Small Fisher-Price dolls were used to represent each
family member. These helped make clear, particularly to younger
children, between which two family members each argument occurred.
Family members were asked to recall the last important argument
involving each two-person set of family members, what it was about,
what each of the other two non-involved family members did during the
argument, how the argument ended, and how often arguments between
these two parties took place. We asked what each of the other family
members did in arguments between a pair: "Think about what did
during the argument. Which of the following comes closest to what
s/he did?" The respondent was then presented a card with these
alternatives: S/he did not know about the argument; tried to avoid
taking sides; agreed with (one party to the argument); agreed with
(other party to the argument); tried to settle the argument without
taking sides, did not care. We did not attempt to assess the
consistency of the reports from different family members because we
did not require them to describe the same argument. We wanted a
variety of situations and types of arguments between each pair of
family members.
Since there were 48 families and four members in each family,
there were 192 reports of what other family members did in arguments
between members of each dyad. Every family member was asked twelve
coalition questions. Thus, the total possible coalitions that could
be named was 2304. For each coalition question, six alternative
responses were presented, only two of which were coalition responses.
Overall, then, a total of 673 coalitions were named.
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Conservative and Revolutionary Coalitions
A conservative coalition is a coalition that does not alter the
existing power structure; whereas a revolutionary coalition is a
coalition that dominates the superior member of the family (i.e., the
one with the most power), and an improper coalition is a coalition
that is neither conservative nor revolutionary. The coalition
measures used differed from the traditional game rules used in
studying coalitions. All family members were not simultaneously
given an opportunity to form coalitions with other family members.
Only one family member at a time chose a coalition partner. Also,
Caplow's (1968) assumption, "in a set of linked triads a coalition
partner in one triad may not be an opponent in another," was not
maintainable. Coalition partners in one triad could be opponents in
another.
The coalition models utilized all depend on the identification of
the power structure of the family. Family power structure was
determined by this question: "Now I'd like to return to consideration
of the set of dolls representing each member of your family. Would
you rank order the dolls in terms of which family member, in your
opinion, has the most and which has the least control over the
property and money that your family has?" The largest number of
respondents, by far (70%), identified the family hierarchy as
follows: F > M > O > Y. This is the classical patripotestal family.
The remainder were about equally divided between F = M > O > Y (16%),
the equipotestal family structure, and M > F > O > Y (14%), a
matricentered family structure.
The definition of conservative, revolutionary, and improper
coalitions followed Gamson (1961a) and Caplow (1968):
Conservative Revolutionary Improper
Type 3 (A = B > C) AB AC, BC --
Type 5 (A < (B + C)) AB BC AC
Type 6 (A > (B + C)) AB, BC -- AC
Type 7 (A = (B + C)) AB -- AC, BC
In order to distinguish between Type 5 and Type 6 coalitions,
questions that asked about the outcome of arguments were used. The
format for these questions was, as follows: "Suppose that (mother)
were to argue with (father) and (older child). Who would be more
likely to give in or agree, (mother) or (father) and (older child)?"
These questions enabled us to determine which coalitions were likely
to win and which were likely to give in or lose.
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FINDINGS
How Frequent Are Family Coalitions?
Respondents were asked to think about what they did during a
specific argument, and to select from several alternatives that may
describe what they actually did. About three out of ten (29.2%)
reported that they participated in a coalition, and these respondents
reported forming a total of 673 coalitions in the 48 families
studied. Hence, arguments precipitated coalitions in less than one-
third of the cases. In over one-fourth (28.2%) of the incidents the
respondent did not know about the argument, and in 8.7% the
respondent reported that s/he did not care. On the other hand, in
7.2% of the incidents the participants tried to settle the argument
without taking sides, and in 11.8% they avoided taking sides. No
information was available for 14.8% of the cases. This information
is relevant to the issue of whether or not the formation of
coalitions is a common or not-so-common response to family conflict.
One might point to the fact that arguments precipitated the formation
of coalitions in only 29.2% of the arguments. This suggests that
quite often dyadic arguments are simply resolved by the participating
parties and that is the end of it. Alternatively, it might be
asserted that, despite attempts to settle arguments by the parties
themselves and the natural tendency of other family members to either
avoid taking sides or stay out of the conflict, in about three out of
ten arguments their scope was enlarged and coalitions were formed.
We are unaware of reliable national sample data on how frequently
family members argue. The definition of what constitutes an argument
is problematic. Family members are prone to distinguish between
disagreements, discussions, and arguments, and may disagree as to
which is the appropriate label. Such differences in perception make
it hard to estimate how often arguments take place and, therefore,
how often they lead to the formation of coalitions.
What Types of Coalitions Predominate in the Family?
Table 1 displays the distribution of the thirteen different types
of two-party coalitions in four-person families. Elsewhere we have
elaborated and tested a status maintenance theory of coalition
formation (Bonacich, Grusky, and Peyrot, 1985) which asserts that
coalitions form to maintain the existing power structure. The
finding in Table 1 shows the strong predominance of parental
coalitions, which make up over 41% of the coalitions formed, are
consistent with this approach, which stresses the significance of
maintaining family solidarity and supporting the status difference
between parents and children.
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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY COALITIONS
Coalition Type N Per Cent
Father + Mother 278 41.31
Mother + Older Daughter (61) (9.06)
Father + Older Son (49) (7.28)
Mother + Older Son (44) (6.54)
Father + Older Daughter (36) (5.35)
Parent + Older Child 190 28.23
Mother + Younger Daughter (36) (5.35)
Father + Younger Son (35) (5.20)
Mother + Younger Son (33) (4.90)
Father + Younger Daughter (25) (3.72)
Parent + Younger Child 129 19.17
Older Daughter + Younger Daughter (27) (4.01)
Older Son + Younger Son (20) (2.97)
Older Daughter + Younger Son (17) (2.53)
Older Son + Younger Daughter (12) (1.78)
Older Child + Younger Child 76 11.29
Total 673 100.00
The institutional significance of maintaining the status hierarchy
is further demonstrated by the finding that the second greatest
number of coalitions are between a parent and an older child (28%),
followed by parent/younger child coalitions (19%), and finally by
older child/younger child coalitions (11%).
How Important is Power in Determining Who Wins and Loses?
Coalition theorists see coalitions as a strategy that members use
to attain their goals. Family members, like political party members
in multi-party political systems, also prefer winning to losing and
may form coalitions for that purpose. Table 2 is designed to answer
the question as to what happens when there are disputes between
family members aligned in coalitions or not aligned.
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TABLE 2. COALITION WINS AND LOSSES WHEN OPPOSING AN INDIVIDUAL OR
ANOTHER COALITION
Opposing an Individual
Coalition Wins Losses Total N
Father + Older Child 70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 192
Father + Younger Child 68.2 31.8 100.0 192
Mother + Older Child 67.2 32.8 100.0 192
Mother + Younger Child 58.3 41.7 100.0 192
Chi Square DF Significance Min in E.F. Cells with E.F. < 5
7.58 3 0.056 65.00 None
________________________________________________________________
Opposing Another Coalition
Coalition Wins Losses Total N
Father + Older Child 54.2% 45.8% 100.0% 192
Father + Younger Child 41.1 58.9 100.0 192
Mother + Older Child 39.1 60.9 100.0 192
Mother + Younger Child 31.8 68.2 100.0 192
Chi Square DF Significance Min in E.F. Cells with E.F. < 5
20.65 3 0.0001 79.75 None
The top half of the table presents the percentage of wins and
losses when particular family coalitions are aligned against an
individual opponent. The table shows that parent-child coalitions
with the father included are more successful than those including the
mother, and that parent-child coalitions with the older child are
more successful than those with the younger child (Chi Square = 7.58,
df = 3, p < .06). The lower half of the table shows a similar
pattern of findings when the opponent is another coalition (Chi
Square = 20.64, df = 3, p < .001).
The fundamental finding is that family power structure remains the
key to winning and losing. Coalitions that include the father are
the strongest and, therefore, the most likely to win. By contrast,
coalitions involving the younger child are the weakest and most
likely to lose.
Conservative Coalition Patterns
The most common status order in a triad would be where A>B and
B>C, and A<B+C. This is the familiar Type 5 pattern. The most
likely coalition is an AB coalition because this facilitates A's
maintainance of control and prevents a BC coalition (a revolutionary
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one in that it upsets the existing power structure). The situation is
somewhat different in the tetrad and in the family. Figure 1 presents
two different conservative coalition structures in the four-person
family. The first pattern shows a parental coalition dominating the
family and opposing children. Since the parents are the two most
powerful individual members of the system, a coalition between these
two is virtually unopposable.
The second pattern is quite different. This structure consists of
two coalitions consisting of each of the parents and the older child.
In this case, not only do the children oppose each other, but perhaps
more significantly the parents co-opt the older child by forming a
coalition that includes him or her. As noted by Selznick (1949),
co-optation refers to the process of assimilating new elements into
the policy-determining or leadership structure of a system. It is
a policy which enables the group in charge of the social system to
maintain its control. Hence, this structure as well as the structure
shown in Figure 1, which consists of a simple spousal coalition,
facilitate the maintenance of the existing status hierarchy.
FIGURE 1. CONSERVATIVE COALITION PATTERNS IN FOUR-PERSON FAMILIES
Parents Oppose Children
A B
Father * * * * Mother
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
Younger Older
Child Child
D C
TYPE 5 Conditions: 2 Parents, 1 Child Key
A>B>C>D **** = coalition
A<(B+C) #### = opponent
A<(C+D)
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Children Oppose One Another
A B
Father Mother
* *
* *
* *
* *
* *
* *
Younger # # # # Older
Child Child
D C
TYPE 6 Conditions: 1 Parent, Children
A>B>C>D
A<(B+C)
A<(C+D)
______________________________________________________________
Adapted from Caplow (1968), p. 70.
A Revolutionary Coalition Pattern
In the triad, the most obvious revolutionary coalition is BC,
which is an obvious threat to A, so much so that, as we noted above,
it induces A to form a coalition with B to prevent a BC coalition.
Again, things are not the same in tetrads or in families.
Figure 2 presents one type of revolutionary coalition pattern that
we found. In this diagram, we find that the second most powerful
family member, the mother, forms separate coalitions with the older
child and with the younger child, thereby isolating the powerful
father. Thus, the father stands in opposition to all three of the
other family members.
FIGURE 2. A REVOLUTIONARY COALITION PATTERN IN FOUR-PERSON FAMILIES
Father Opposes Others
A B
Father # # # # Mother
# # * *
# # * *
# # * *
# * # *
# * # *
# * # *
Younger Older
Child Child
D C
TYPE 5 Conditions: 2 Parents, 1 Child Key
A>B>C>D **** = coalition
A<(B+C) #### = opponent
A<(C+D)
______________________________________________________________
Adapted from Caplow (1968), p. 71.
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Is Family Composition Related to Coalition Structure?
In order to enhance and maintain family stability, families develop
norms that limit conflict in certain subsystems. Since the spousal
subsystem is the most crucial one for family survival, conflict is
least likely to be tolerated in that system. Indeed, solidarity in
the spousal subsystem is essential for the survival of the system
(Cousins, 1960). The finding that spousal coalitions were by far the
most common type supports this perspective. Parent-child
relationships are also important to family solidarity. Elsewhere
(Grusky, Bonacich, and Peyrot, 1988) we have shown that male children
are more involved in family conflict than female children. Conflict
can contribute to family solidarity if it integrates the parents and
ties them more closely to the family. We proposed that older sons
enter conservative and avoid revolutionary coalitions to help
maintain family solidarity.
Table 3 shows that family composition is related to the average
number of conservative coalitions. Specifically, it shows that there
is a significant main effect: older son families are more likely than
older daughter families to form conservative coalitions (df = 1, F =
7.23, P = .01).
TABLE 3. FAMILY COMPOSITION AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONSERVATIVE
COALITIONS
Family Composition Mean Std. Dev.
a. Older Daughter + Younger Son 7.00 2.04
b. Older Son + Younger Daughter 10.92 4.34
c. Two Girls 9.67 4.42
d. Two Boys 11.42 3.03
e. Older Daughter (a & c) 8.33 3.63
f. Older Son (b & d) 11.17 3.67
Table 4 provides additional support for this (and other
alternative) formulations. Revolutionary coalitions and improper
coalitions are much less frequent than are conservative coalitions.
The mean number of conservative coalitions for the 48 families was
9.75, S.D. = 3.88; for the revolutionary coalitions, the mean was
1.56, S.D. = 2.75; and for improper coalitions, the mean was 2.70,
S.D. = 1.94 (Conservative versus revolutionary coalitions, p < .001;
and conservative versus improper coalitions, p < .001). Hence, the
basic finding is that stable family organizations prefer conservative
coalitions.
Table 4 shows that older son families are less likely than older
daughter families to form either revolutionary coalitions (df = 1, F
= 5.55, P = .023) or improper coalitions (df = 1, F = 7.2, P = .01).
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TABLE 4. FAMILY COMPOSITION AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY
AND IMPROPER COALITIONS
Revolutionary Coalitions
Family Composition Mean Std. Dev.
a. Older Daughter + Younger Son 2.08 2.68
b. Older Son + Younger Daughter .50 .67
c. Two Girls 2.83 4.45
d. Two Boys .83 1.12
e. Older Daughter (a & c) 2.46 3.61
f. Older Son (b & d) .67 .92
__________________________________________________________________
Improper Coalitions
Family Composition Mean Std. Dev.
a. Older Daughter + Younger Son 2.67 1.72
b. Older Son + Younger Daughter 3.42 1.83
c. Two Girls 1.33 1.16
d. Two Boys 3.42 2.32
e. Older Daughter (a & c) 2.00 1.59
f. Older Son (b & d) 3.42 2.04
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends Caplow's theory of coalitions in triads to
four-person groups, or tetrads. Organizationally, tetrads differ
from triads in two major ways. First, tetrads are more complex and
allow for greater opportunity for coalition formation. Willis (1962)
has identified seventeen different types of coalitions in the tetrad
and has predicted the most frequent kinds of two-way and three-way
coalitions within each type. However, Willis did not apply his
formulations to families. Second, in addition to their greater
complexity, tetrads permit the possibility of counter-coalitions.
Thus, we have applied Caplow's theory of power in triads to the
study of four-person families, or tetrads, and have examined four
questions:
(1) How frequent are coalitions? We found that arguments led to
coalitions in about three out of ten cases, leading to the formation
of 673 coalitions. Although in this study we cannot answer the
question as to whether or not coalitions are frequent or rare in
American families, the data presented, at the very least, suggest
that coalitions exist in many families, and consequently are worthy
of study.
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(2) What types of coalitions predominate in the family? We found
that spousal coalitions were the dominant form. This finding is
consistent with a theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance
of maintaining family solidarity.
(3) How important is power in determining who wins or loses? We
found support for Caplow's model, asserting that power counts in
family decision-making. Coalitions involving the father were the
ones most likely to win; whereas those involving the younger child
were the weakest and were most likely to lose.
(4) Is family composition related to coalition structure? Some
evidence was found that family composition is related to the
formation of conservative, revolutionary, and improper coalitions.
Older son families were less likely than older daughter families to
form revolutionary or improper coalitions.
ENDNOTE
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Asian-Pacific
Regional Conference of Psychology, International Union of
Psychological Science, Guangzhou, China, 1995. Grusky and Bonacich
gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation
grant SOC-78-07131 and National Institute of Mental Health grant MH-
19127.
REFERENCES
Bonacich, Phillip, Oscar Grusky, and Mark Peyrot. 1985. "Family
Coalitions: A New Approach and Method." Social Psychology Quarterly
48:42-50.
Caplow, Theodore. 1968. Two Against One: Coalitions in the Triad.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Coleman, James. 1991. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press.
Cook, Karen S. and Mary R. Gillmore. 1984. "Power, Dependence, and
Coalitions." in Edward J. Lawler (ed.), Advances in Group Processes,
Vol. 1, 27-58, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press.
Cousins, Albert N. 1960. "The Failure of Solidarity" in Norman W.
Bell and Ezra F. Vogel (eds.), The Family, 403-416, Glencoe, llinois:
The Free Press.
Gamson, William A. 1961a. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." American
Sociological Review, 26:373-382.
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------. 1962b."An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition
Formation." American Sociological Review 26:565-573.
Grusky, Oscar, Phillip Bonacich, and Mark Peyrot. 1988. "Group
Structure and Interpersonal Conflict in the Family." in Edward J.
Lawler and Barry Markovsky (eds.), Advances in Group Processes, Vol.
5, 29-51, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press.
McGinnis, Michael. 1991. "Richardson, Rationality and Restrictive
Models of Arms Races." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:443-73.
Rappoport, Anatol. 1957. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. London: Oxford
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Willis, Richard H. 1962. "Coalitions in the Tetrad." Sociometry
25:358-76.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Oscar Grusky is Professor of Sociology at UCLA and Director, NIMH-
supported AIDS research training program. His current research concerns
the organization of managed mental health care systems for children and
adults with emotional disorders and the role of the child in family
coalitions. Email address: grusky@soc.sscnet.ucla.edu
Phillip Bonacich is Professor of Sociology at UCLA. His current research
interest is power and coalitions within exchange networks. Email address:
bonacich@soc.sscnet.ucla.edu
Cynthia Webster is Lecturer in Sociology at UCLA. She received her Ph.D.
from the University of California, Irvine in 1993. Her current research
interests are social networks and quantitative methods. Email address:
webster@soc.sscnet.ucla.edu