After publication of CRISP volume 1, issue 1, we received the following addendum to that issue from the author, Phillip Bonacich:
Note:
I would like to refer to two additional pieces of research that have described bargaining in exchange networks as a social dilemma. Willer and Skvoretz (1995) suggest that two relatively powerless positions both attempting to transact with one powerful position are in a prisoner's dilemma. This is type III in my typology of social dilemmas. Second, Elisa Bienenstock, in her Ph.D. dissertation (1992:102-103) pointed out that in unstable situations with many possible exchange patterns, it may be in the interest of pairs of positions to "marry' each other, ruling out other partners even when these alternative partners make better offers. This corresponds to type II in my typology.
REFERENCES
Bienenstock, Elisa. 1992. Game Theory Models for Exchange Networks: An Experimental Study. Dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles.
Willer, David, and John Skvoretz. 1995. "Power and the P/D Game." Paper presented at West coast Conference for Small Group Research. Santa Barbara, CA. March.
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