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Status Change and the Presentation of Minority Perspectives

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ABSTRACT

How does the presentation of minority perspectives in the context of group problem-solving tasks affect the relative status positions of group members? The answer seems to depend on the initial position of the minority view presenters. Results from a controlled laboratory experiment show support for the hypothesis that people lose status for presenting minority views, but only when in higher-status positions. Unexpectedly, lower-status group members gain relative status by presenting minority perspectives. Research implications and suggestions for future research are specified.

INTRODUCTION

This research investigates how the presentation of minority perspectives results in a loss of relative status position in decision-making groups. In this research, minority perspectives are views held by a numerical minority in a group. Though previous research details how groups' capacities for idea generation may be enhanced through the exposure to minority views, by presenting a minority perspective the minority view presenter's status position in a group may be compromised (Nemeth 1986).

The presentation of minority views alters group members' thought processes in potentially beneficial ways. Yet, minority perspectives are often left unstated. Although some group members may possess minority views, they may feel hesitant to express them (Janis 1982). This raises the question, "Why would people decide to withhold the minority perspectives they may have if by stating them they could potentially benefit the group's outcome?" Status characteristics theory and status violation theory both provide insights as to why some minority perspectives might be left unstated (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972, Berger Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977; Wagner 1988).

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Minority Influence Theory

The foundations of minority influence theory emerged as a reaction to the historically dominant view in social psychology that influence was unidirectional, from the majority to the minority,

from views held by most people to those held by a fewer number of people. In the earliest statements of the impact of minority views on the majority, Moscovici (1976, 1980) argued that the dominant perspective was flawed and inadequately represented group processes, especially with regard to social change. The notion that influence was a “top-down” process struck Moscovici as inconsistent with the historical realities of change (Moscovici and Nemeth 1974).

To capture this reversal of the dominant perspective on influence, Moscovici and Faucheux (1972), and later, Moscovici (1980) developed a theory of conversion behavior. At the theory’s core are three predictions: (1) Majority influences lead people to focus on the relationships they have with members of the majority (interpersonal focus), whereas minority influences lead people to pay more attention on the minority’s message (message focus); (2) Under majority influences, people evaluate the social value of the majority group, but when exposed to minority views, they evaluate the content of the minority source’s message; and (3) People will analyze a minority message to a greater extent than they will a majority message because of the greater directed attention on a minority’s arguments.

Nemeth (1986) extends minority influence theory’s fundamental claim that minorities can influence majority opinions and attitudes by claiming that exposure to a dissenting, minority view has a positive impact on decision-making processes, countering the limited thought capacities that those exposed only to majority perspectives experience (Asch 1951, 1955). Even when they are inaccurate, dissenting positions contribute positively to group performances because they can stimulate thought that considers more information and more options, culminating in better decision-making processes and results. Nemeth (1986) claims that minorities do more than hinder the negative outcomes of conformity to the majority. Minorities also stimulate group members to think about the situation the group is addressing in more divergent ways.

Although research indicates that the presentation of a minority view alters group members’ thought processes and increases attention to novel alternatives, minority perspectives are often left unstated. This raises the question, “Why would a group member withhold the presentation of a minority perspective?” Torrance’s (1959) research suggests the importance of investigating the different expectations people have of group members who occupy different status positions in a group and, therefore, the relationship between these status-based expectations and responses to the presentation of minority views.

Nemeth (1988) and Garlick and Mongeau (1993) were among the first to link status and minority influence. Yet, neither of these works examines the potential effects of presenting minority views on the relative status position of the presenter. Status processes theorized by status characteristics theory (Berger, et al., 1972, 1977) and status violation theory (Wagner 1988) offer insights about how expectations for performance shape decisions to present minority views and how they condition responses to minority views.

Status Characteristics Theory

Status characteristics theory (SCT) (Berger, et al., 1972, 1977) is a theory of interaction and the development of performance expectations on the basis of group members’ characteristics in task-

oriented and collectively oriented groups. The theory explains how group members' characteristics become the basis of observable inequalities in face-to-face social interaction through the development of performance expectations. Status is the relative level of honor, prestige, and respect garnered by group members. Members of a group form expectations for competence for themselves and other group members on the basis of members' attributes, resulting in the formation of a status hierarchy based on these relative competency expectations. Status is a valued resource and people seek to preserve the status they have (Troyer, Younts, and Kalkhoff 2001; Troyer and Younts 1997). That is, people try to behave in ways that permit them to maintain the status they possess.

One way people may lose status is through receiving negative evaluations for their contributions from other group members (Silver and Troyer 1998). When a person's contributions are negatively evaluated during the course of a group discussion, other group members' competency expectations for the negatively-evaluated group member are reduced, causing a reduction in status position. Thus, people may hesitate to make contributions to a group's discussion when they believe that their contributions will be met with negative evaluations and status loss.

This hesitation to contribute to a group discussion for fear of status loss operates differently depending on a person's position in a status hierarchy. Higher-status group members' fear of status loss is less intense than lower-status group members' fear of status loss for three reasons. First, higher-status people are not as likely to receive negative evaluations as lower-status people for the same contribution (Foschi, Lai, and Sigerson 1994; Foschi, Warriner, and Hart 1985). While there may be more opportunities to evaluate higher-status group members than lower-status group members because of their higher rate of contributing, negative evaluations of higher-status group members are less likely to occur.

Second, negative evaluations directed at a higher-status person from a lower-status person are less damaging to the higher-status person. Silver and Troyer (1998) suggest that the effect of negative evaluations on status loss is moderated by the status of the evaluator. The detrimental effects of negative evaluations on status position are amplified when the evaluator is higher-status. Moreover, the rate of status losses resulting from negative evaluations increase at an increasing rate as the distance between a higher-status evaluator and lower-status target increases (Silver and Troyer 1998). In parallel fashion, Silver and Troyer (1998) theorize that the rate of status losses resulting from negative evaluations decreases at a decreasing rate as the distance between a lower-status evaluator and higher-status target increases.

Third, lower-status people face an additional penalty for contributing to a group's task if their contribution contradicts the contributions of higher-status people. SCT (Berger, et al. 1972, 1977) theorizes that lower-status people are expected to accept the influence of higher-status people. A lower-status person whose contributions to the group's task have the effect of challenging these expectations for lower-status people experiences status loss, a phenomenon theorized by Wagner (1988) in his theory of status violations and empirically tested by Younggreen and Moore (2008).

Though Nemeth's work (1988) and the work of Garlick and Mongeau (1993) were among the firsts to address the relationship between status and minority perspectives, to date, research has

not been conducted that systematically explores how a person's status position might be affected by the presentation of a minority view. This is the focus of this research.

METHODS

I created an experiment to gather data used to test several hypotheses. In the experiment, a higher- or lower-status research confederate presented either a minority or non-minority view in response to a group problem, depending on the specific experimental condition to which research participants were randomly assigned. All participants were asked to make status ratings both before and after the presentation of the minority or non-minority view.

Experimental Design

The experimental design was a 2 x 2 factorial design (Confederate Status: Higher vs. Lower; Minority View: Presented vs. Not Presented). Three-person groups participated in each condition. Two group members were naïve participants and one member was a research confederate. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. The presentation of the minority view was manipulated through the contributions of the confederate.

Participants

Research participants were recruited from undergraduate courses at a large, midwestern university. Two hundred female students participated in the study. Each participant was paid ten dollars. Because research confederates were female, only females were scheduled to participate in the experiment to prevent introducing a confounding status dimension (sex) to the study (Wagner, Ford, and Ford 1986).

Task Instructions, Experimental Manipulations, and Dependent Variables

All experimental instructions were conveyed through a software program. Participants were told that the study was aimed at understanding how groups work to solve problems. Next, participants were asked to take a short "Meaning Insight" test, but were told nothing more about the purpose of the test in the study. This test has been used as a basis for assigning status and has been shown to generate performance expectations in a variety of experimental studies (Berger, Fisek, and Freese 1976, Berger, Norman, Balkwell, and Smith 1992; Markovsky, Smith, and Berger 1984; Webster 1977). Participants viewed 10 Meaning Insight problems, which provided the basis for the status manipulation.

Then, participants were told that their next task involved an exercise in a hypothetical outdoor survival scenario, a variant of the Winter Survival Task (Johnson & Johnson 1991; Silver, Cohen, and Crutchfield 1994). After reading a survival scenario, participants were asked to individually think of the single best use for each of the following three items: a loaded .45-caliber pistol, a can of Crisco, and 6-feet of rope. For each item, participants typed their responses into their computer.

After group members entered their ideas, they were exposed to the ideas of other group members about the survival items. Participants viewed a list of each of the ideas, unaware which group

member thought of which ideas. Participants were asked to rank-order the ideas in terms of their effectiveness in promoting survival (from 1 to 9, 1 = best idea, 9 = worst idea).

The confederate’s survival ideas were programmed according to experimental condition. Each of the confederate’s ideas were, in actuality, survival uses drawn from previous research using the same stimuli (Troyer & Silver 1996). From these past studies spanning four experiments and hundreds of participants, a list of the frequencies with which participants cited different survival ideas was developed. In conditions in which minority views were presented (Conditions 1 and 3), the confederate’s ideas that appeared on the list of ideas participants viewed were uncommon, unusual, unexpected survival uses. In conditions in which non-minority views were presented (Conditions 2 and 4), the confederate’s ideas were common, usual, expected survival uses. The actual non-minority/minority uses for each item are reported in Table 1.

Table 1. Confederate’s Survival Ideas by Minority View/Non-Minority View

<u>Survival Items</u>	<u>Minority view</u> (Conditions 1 & 3)	<u>Non-Minority view</u> (Conditions 2 & 4)
Loaded .45-caliber pistol	make a gunpowder explosion from bullets to start an avalanche to attract attention	use it for hunting
Can of Crisco	use paper wrapping on can as kindling to start fire	eat for food
6 feet of rope	smoke it for relaxation	climb trees with it

After participants ranked the nine survival ideas (3 of their own ideas, 3 generated by the other participant, and 3 the confederate generated), group members’ scores on the Meaning Insight test completed earlier in the session were revealed. By telling participants that their score on the test was closely related to their outdoor survival skills, the test score became directly relevant to competency at the group’s survival exercise. This served to legitimate the status hierarchy.

In all conditions, one participant was randomly assigned to a higher-status position and learned that she scored 90% on the Meaning Insight test. The other participant was assigned to the lower-status position in the group and learned that she scored 20% on the Meaning Insight test. In the confederate’s higher-status conditions, the group learned that she scored 90% on the Meaning Insight test, and in the conditions in which the confederate was lower-status, the group learned that she scored a 20% on the Meaning Insight test.

Next, participants completed a survey collecting information about participants’ status perceptions and competency expectations of self and others. These ratings were compared with responses to a final status-perception questionnaire administered after the manipulation of minority perspectives. This comparison is an operationalization of status change.

Then, participants convened in a discussion group. They were asked to begin by claiming which survival ideas they thought of. After each member made these declarations, the group had an open-ended discussion in which they identified the strengths and weaknesses of each idea.

During the group discussion, the confederate had two tasks: (1) to behave in ways consistent with her status position, and; (2) convey either a minority or non-minority viewpoint.

In the higher-status, minority-view condition, the confederate took charge of the discussion from the outset. She contributed to the group as much as she was able, looked directly at the person with whom she was speaking, spoke in a confident, very audible manner, and maintained an erect posture. When participants discounted her minority views, the confederate responded directly and firmly, supporting her position with rational logic, confidence, and consistency. In the higher-status, non-minority view condition, the confederate duplicated the behaviors of the confederate in the higher-status, minority position, those that would be expected of someone in a higher-status position. The confederate in this condition, however, presented the expected, common, usual, non-minority ideas in response to the three survival items.

In the lower-status, minority view condition, she turned her body slightly from the group, allowed other group members to speak first, and positively evaluated other group members' ideas, all behaviors consistent with her status position. Contrary to what might be expected of a lower-status person, however, the confederate presented her ideas confidently and consistently, refusing to accept others' ideas, qualities required for the successful presentation of minority views (Bray, Johnson, and Chilstrom 1982; Maass, Clark and Haberkorn 1982; Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux 1969; Moscovici and Neve 1973; Nemeth and Wachtler 1973, 1974). A firm and consistent level of contradiction is inconsistent with the expected behaviors of lower-status group members. As such, the confederate's actions in this condition amount to status-violating behaviors (Wagner 1988; Younggreen and Moore 2008). In the lower-status, non-minority view condition, the confederate behaved in a manner consistent with what would be expected from a lower-status group member. The confederate's survival ideas were the expected, common ideas that were very similar to those of other group members. In the infrequent event of a contradiction to the confederate's ideas, the confederate quickly deferred.

Next, group members re-ranked the nine survival ideas that the group discussed. As before, they were instructed to assign a ranking number for each idea from 1 to 9. These rankings, when compared with the initial rankings group members made prior to learning who had which ideas and prior to the group discussion, operationalize influence. A group member exerted influence if a participant's final ranking of that member's ideas after the group discussion was higher (numerically lower) than the participant's initial rankings of that member's ideas before the group discussion, but after the participant knew which member suggested them. After completing these rankings, participants completed an additional survey, responding to items identical to those on the initial survey completed after the status manipulation, but before the group discussion. Participants were also asked to consider themselves and other group members in light of future, similar group tasks (e.g., "How valuable would you be in a future group with a similar group task?"). Additional items added to this survey addressed how likable, confident, reasonable, and consistent other group members were perceived to be by participants (100-point scales anchored by, for example, "Not at All Confident" and "Extremely Confident").

Status change, one of the dependent variables in the study was calculated as the differences between participants' status ratings of the confederate before and after the group discussion. Positive differences reflect status increases; negative differences reflect status loss (e.g., group

member who participants rate as more competent before the group discussion and as less competent after the group discussion has lost status). Each status rating difference was analyzed individually, and a summed composite status score was created and treated as a dependent variable indicating status change.

Hypotheses

The purpose of collecting the data from the experiment was to test the following hypotheses.

H1: Higher-status group members will be more influential than lower-status group members.

This is put forth to test the main status manipulation in the experiment.

H2: If a person espouses a minority view, then the person will lose status.

This hypothesis tests the main idea in this research that status loss results from presenting a minority view.

H3: Lower status people will lose more status than higher status people for presenting the same minority view.

This hypothesis is grounded in research indicating that there are different consequences for people at different places in a group's status hierarchy for making the same contribution.

RESULTS

Before examining the effect of status position and minority views on influence and status loss, I assessed the strength of the status manipulation in terms of status ratings prior to the minority view manipulation. Participants rated the confederate, the other participant, and themselves on competency, value to the group, knowledge in the group's task, and confidence in ability at the group's task. Additionally, participants rated how much they would like it if the other participant and the confederate joined the group. Each was on a 100-point scale.

The status ratings made of the confederate by participants were compared with the ratings made of the group member occupying a different status position. For example, in each group, Person A (participant) was lower status and Person C (also participant) was higher status. In conditions in which the confederate was higher status, Person C's status ratings of Person A (lower-status participant) were compared with Person C's ratings of the confederate. By subtracting the status rating of the confederate from the rating of the other group member as described above, a difference score was calculated indicating the status differences between higher and lower-status group members in a group. Positive difference scores indicate that the confederate was rated more highly than the participant with whom she was compared, and negative difference scores indicate the opposite. Table 2 reports the means and mean differences of status ratings between higher- and lower-status confederates on each status rating item.

Table 2. Means and Mean Differences of Status Rating Difference Scores by Confederate Status, N=100

Status Rating Item	Confederate Status		Mean Difference
	Higher (N=50)	Lower (N=50)	
Competence	19.92 (4.02)	-20.56 (2.59)	39.85*
Knowledge	19.80 (3.43)	-13.14 (2.46)	32.92*
Value to Group	28.58 (3.99)	-21.94 (2.42)	50.52*
Confidence in Ability	25.06 (3.93)	-17.18 (2.78)	42.24*
Join Group	24.38 (4.03)	-12.58 (2.79)	36.96*

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the means.

* $p < .000$, 1-tailed tests

For each of the status rating items, the difference between the higher-status and lower-status group member in each group was significant, in the expected direction, and strongly favored the higher-status group member. Reliability analyses of the status rating items in Table 1 indicate that the items measured the same construct (Cronbach's alpha = .96). Thus, I created the scale variable *TIstatus*, or the sum of the initial status difference ratings between the confederate and the participant at a different status position in the group. The difference between *TIstatus* means for higher-status (117.74) and lower-status (-85.40) confederates was significant ($t = -9.95$, $p = .000$) and in the expected direction.

Influence

The difference in rankings before and after the group discussion operationalized influence. For analytic purposes, the rank orderings were reversed such that positive rank change coefficients indicate influence. If a group member's ideas were ranked higher by other group members after the group discussion, the group member exerted influence. Table 3 reports the results of regression models with the confederate's status position (dummy variable coded 0=lower status, 1=higher status), contribution type (dummy variable coded 0=non-minority, 1=minority), and an interaction term (status x minority) as the independent variables and survival idea rank change as the dependent variable.

Table 3. Regressions of Survival Idea Rank Change on Confederate's Status Position, Minority View, and Status Position of Minority View, N=200

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Pistol</u>	<u>Crisco</u>	<u>Rope</u>
Higher Status	-.260 (.523)	.800** (.444)	1.460*** (.382)
Minority View	-.220 (.523)	.760 (.444)	.060 (.382)
Higher Status X Minority View	.445 (.742)	-.725 (.630)	-1.287* (.541)
	F: .123 Sig.: .946 R ² : .002	F: 1.62 Sig.: .186 R ² : .024	F: 6.50 Sig.: .000 R ² : .091

* $p < .05$, 2-tailed tests

** $p < .05$, 1-tailed tests

*** $p < .001$, 1-tailed tests

The results reported in Table 3 indicate partial support for H1 and an interesting interaction effect. Controlling for the view presented by the confederate (non-minority or minority) and for the status of the confederate presenting the minority view (higher or lower), participants' rankings of the higher-status confederates' ideas for the Crisco ($p < .05$, one-tailed test) and for the rope ($p = .001$, one-tailed test) improved relative to rankings of lower-status confederates' ideas. Unexpectedly, higher-status confederates presenting a minority view about rope usage were significantly *less* able to influence participants than lower-status confederates presenting the same minority view ($p = .05$, two-tailed test). Stated differently, lower-status confederates presenting minority views with regard to the rope exerted more influence.

Status Change

Before and after the group convened to discuss the survival ideas belonging to each group member, participants provided status ratings for each group member (including themselves). Differences between status ratings before and after the group discussion indicate status change. The ratings of the confederate and the participant sharing a status position (i.e., higher or lower) by the other participant form the foundation of the outcomes for the analysis of status change. To calculate status change difference, the following occurred: (1) a status-change score was created for the comparison participant and the confederate for each of the five status rating variables (i.e., rating after the group discussion minus rating before the group discussion); (2) the comparison participant's status-change score on each of the status rating items was subtracted from the confederate's status-change score on the same status-change items. This resulted in a difference score for each of the status-change items that captures the relative status gain or loss by the confederate compared to the participant in the same status position. Positive values indicate an increase in the confederate's status position after the group discussion relative to the participant in the group initially sharing the same status position. Negative values indicate the opposite. A reliability analysis of the scale variable produces sufficient reliability for a 5-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = .92). Further, a factor analysis of the 5 items in the status change difference scale produced one factor explaining 77.08 percent of the variance with all factor loadings greater than .80.

H2 claims that confederates presenting minority views will experience more status loss than confederates presenting non-minority views. H3 claims that lower-status minority view presenters will lose more status than higher-status minority view presenters. Table 4 reports standardized the results of a regression model with the confederate's status position (dummy variable coded 0=higher status, 1=lower status), contribution type (dummy variable coded 0=non-minority, 1=minority), and an interaction term (status x minority) as the independent variables and status difference change score as the dependent variable.

Table 4. Regressions of Status Difference Change Score on Confederate's Status Position, Minority View, and Status Position of Minority View, N=100

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Status Difference Change Score</u>
Higher Status	.035
Minority View	-.242*
Lower Status X Minority View	.318**
	F: 4.051
	Sig.: .008
	R ² : .059

* $p < .05$, 2-tailed tests

** $p < .01$, 2-tailed tests

The results in Table 2 support H2. The presentation of minority views results in a significant loss of status relative to the presentation of non-majority views ($p < .05$, two-tailed test). The results do not, however, support H3, the claim that lower-status minority-view presenters lose more status than higher-status minority view presenters. In fact, the results indicate the exact opposite. Lower-status minority view presenters significantly *gained* status relative to other group members ($p < .01$, two-tailed test). This gain among lower-status minority view presenters was big enough to offset the negative effect of presenting a minority view net of status position.

DISCUSSION

While previous research has established the benefit minority perspectives provide in group problem solving, this research illustrates the challenges and the unexpected benefits that people presenting such minority views experience. In some cases, when higher-status people presented minority perspectives, they were less able to influence others than when lower-status people presented the same ideas. Furthermore, higher-status minority view presenters lost status as a result of their minority positions.

The pattern of reduction in influence and status of the higher-status confederate presenting a minority view suggests that participants' reactions may have been driven by a common source. It is likely that this source was the confederates' deviation from participants' expectations. From the results reported in Table 2, participants clearly perceived the higher-status confederate as more competent, knowledgeable, and valuable to the group; were more confident in the higher-status confederate's ability, and wanted to be in a group with the higher-status confederate more

than the lower-status confederate. As participants joined the group discussion with these heightened expectations, the incongruence between these expectations and the impressions they formed of the higher-status confederate presenting the minority view likely resulted in status loss. Participants were expecting the higher-status person to present solid, useful survival ideas that they could stand behind and that would lead them to safety. Instead, they were exposed to unpopular, unexpected ideas. This lack of congruence between participants' expectations and perceptions of the higher-status confederate presenting a minority view resulted in participants' reduction in their willingness to be influenced by and grant status to this confederate.

Theory and research on the differential sanctioning of people in different status positions for behavior that deviates from expectations, in this case, the presentation of minority views, is inconsistent. On the one hand, Hollander (1958) emphasizes that non-leaders expect that leaders' behaviors are intended to aid the group in reaching its goal to such a large extent that leaders may be permitted, or in some cases required, to violate less serious norms. Leaders in such situations own "idiosyncrasy credits," or a behavioral latitude not afforded lower-status, non-leaders. As such, group leaders are not sanctioned as severely for unexpected behaviors because non-leaders believe such behaviors are performed with the overarching intent to achieve the group's goal.

On the other hand, Wahrman (1970) asserts that when the behaviors of higher-status people deviate from the higher performance expectations lower-status people have for higher-status people, more extreme sanctions result. If a group applies a "deviant" label to a higher-status person because of non-conforming behavior (e.g., presenting and defending a minority view), the sanctions that result will reflect disapproval of the behavior, but also disappointment with the source of the behavior for violating the set of higher expectations (see Wagner 1988; Younggreen and Moore 2008). Wahrman's (1970) experimental results support this idea, showing that as the status of a participant's supposed partner increased, annoyance with deviant behavior increased as did the deviant's status loss in the group. The experimental results in this research coincide with Wahrman's (197) account of more severe sanctioning of higher-status deviants.

The idea that presenting a minority view results in status loss and influence ability reduction among higher status people would be a compelling topic to examine in recurring groups. What might happen to a higher-status person's status position if the person repeatedly presented unpopular, minority views? Future research could compare these outcomes in less formal decision-making groups or with groups possessing status structures based on formal positions (e.g., Vice-President).

Perhaps the most interesting and unexpected finding concerns the increase in influence ability (in one model) and status experienced by the lower-status, minority view presenter. How can this counter-hypothesis finding be explained? While presenting a minority perspective from a lower-status position in this study amounts to a status violation (Wagner 1988), it also requires the expression of ideas with consistency and confidence. Such a display could, potentially, counteract the negative outcomes typically realized in the violation of status-based expectations of lower-status group members. While expected from higher-status positions, consistently and confidently presented ideas from a lower-status position may be simultaneously unexpected yet valued, and therefore rewarded in the form of status granting. If this is the case, then a future,

potentially fruitful research question is, “At what threshold would the presentation of minority perspectives stop being rewarded with status granting?” Practically, and in extending the scope of the research, the answer to such a question might be important to new political candidates who ground their campaigns on minority ideas that appeal to voters weary of longstanding, ineffective programs. If elected, how long can a new politician persist in presenting minority views and still gain status? At what point is the politician expected to begin espousing the majority view such that the loss of status is prevented?

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APPENDIX A: CORRELATION MATRIX

	Histatus	Minority	CompetenceT1	KnowledgeT1	ValueT1	ConfidenceT1	JoinT1
Histatus	1						
Minority	.000	1					
CompetenceT1	.411	-.125	1				
KnowledgeT1	.338	-.069	.699	1			
ValueT1	.448	-.046	.678	.656	1		
ConfidenceT1	.358	-.050	.680	.686	.642	1	
JoinT1	.336	-.040	.592	.603	.593	.671	1
StatusT1	.446	-.077	.858	.850	.841	.876	.818
PistolChg	-.006	.002	-.010	-.067	-.072	.023	-.030
CriscoChg	.094	.085	.079	.028	.155	.103	.054
RopeChg	.202	-.151	.189	.115	.166	.071	.035
StatusChg	-.149	-.058	-.270	-.291	-.318	-.185	-.263

	StatusT1	PistolChg	CriscoChg	RopeChg	StatusChg
StatusT1	1				
PistolChg	-.034	1			
CriscoChg	.101	-.091	1		
RopeChg	.134	-.118	.098	1	
StatusChg	-.310	.236	.162	.079	1

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